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ABSTRACT
This thesis calculates and compares the marginal cost of
graduating a naval officer from the United States Naval
Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC),
and Officer Candidate School (OCS). After defining the
variable and fixed cost functions for each conuissioning
source, the total cost, average cost, and marginal cost per
graduate are calculated for fiscal year 1989 graduates.
Compared to average cost, the marginal cost per Academy
graduate is more in line with the marginal cost per graduate
for NROTC, and OCS. The results support the conclusion tLat
a majority of the Naval Academy's costs are fixed in the
short-run and that savings realized by reducing the number of
graduates would be overstated by using average cost. This
thesis recommends using marginal cost to estimate savings from
reductions in officer accessions in the short-run.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
&. SOURCE OF THE ISSUE
in the 1990s, the military of the United States is likely
to face significant changes in force structure and reductions
of personnel. These reductions will be caused primarily by
two major factors. First, while the early 1980s represented
growth in the military, federal tax and expenditure policies
also created a large budget deficit that the government is
currently dedicated to reducing. Secmd, 1989 culminated with
the overthrow of communism in eastern Europe, and the fall of
the Berlin wall. This, coupled with improved relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, has provided
the major impetus for a smaller, restructured fmerican
military force.
Despite the current military deployment to the Persian
Gulf region, which may slow force reductions in the short-run,
the perceived end of the cold war and the federal budget
constraints will for~o the United States Navy to progress
towards a maller fleet within the next five years. This
action will have a direct impact on officer and enlisted end-
strength. Currently, top Congressional, Department of
Defense, and Navy leaders are attempting to determine how
officer end-strength will be reduced. One method is to
reduce officer accessions. if this method is chosen, the
1
questions that must be answered include how much to reduce and
from which sources.
The Navy comnissions its officers through various
programs. The three predominant sources, accounting for 54
percent of officer accessions in fiscal year 1989, are: U.S.
Naval Academy (USNA). Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps
(NROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) ERef. 1:p. 2].
When determining where and by how much to reduce
accessions, several factors must be incorporated into the
decision-making process. At a minimum, these include: th*
anticipated future steady state site of the Navy, the unique
contributions of each comissioning source, costs of
commissioning an officer by source, differences in officer
productivity by source and warfare specialty, differences in
officer retention, measures of conmissioning source
efficiency, effects on conMis3ioning equal opportunity goals,
effects on the number of technically-trained officers
required, and the political implications involved with
reducing commissions from each source.
In April 1990. Senator John Glenn, D-Ohio, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Comittee's Subcommittee on Manpower and
Personnel, raised important questions concerning the costs and
value of service academy education, including the retention
of academy graduates compared with officers from other
sources. One specific concern is that service academies
2
are "the most expensive way to train officers, yet graduates
do not remain in service significantly longer than other
officers." His "bottom line question" is "whether they (the
academies) are providing the kind of career-oriented officers
needed to provide leadership." ERef. 2:p. 8] Christopher
Jahn, the Assistant Secretary of Defente, Force Management and
Personnel, believes "each of the three conmissioning sources
is essential and serves a purpose that complements the other
in terms of quality and readiness." [Ref. 2:p. 8] Barbara S.
Pope, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, states "as the site of the force gets smaller
in the years ahead, we must maintain a balance between all
sources of accessions.* ERef. 2:p. 8]
In a statement before Senator Glenn's subcommittee on 4
April 1990, Robert F. Hale, the Assistant Director of the
National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Offtie,
reported that it costs the government $153,000 for a Naval
Academy graduate, $53,000 to train an officer in HROTC, and
$20,000 to graduate an officer through OCS [gef. 3:p, 63. In
Hale's study, his numbers are calculated using the concept of
average cost. An alternative method would be to use the
concept of marginal cost. Hale states:
average costs would, however overestimate the
effects of small changes in the numbers of
students, particularly at the academies. The
academies incur substantial costs to maintain their
facilities and basic educational services ... which
would not change if there were small changes in the
numbers of students. Assessing the effects of
small changes in the numbers of students would
require an estimate of marginal costs. [Ref. 3:p.
9)
When decisions must be made regarding incremental changes in
the size of an operation, or program, marginal cost is the
relevant variable.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis is an analysis of the marginal cost of
commissioning Naval officers from the three major accession
sources. This research will first identify exactly what costs
are relevant to graduating an officer from each source.
Second, cost data will be collected from each commissioning
source. The cost data will be disaggregated into several
different categories. A third task will be to use these
categories to Jefine three different components for each
commissioning source: total cost, variable cost, and fixed
cost. The marginal cost of graduating a Naval officer through
each particular program will be derived from these components.
The objective is to utilize the marginal cost results to
demonstrate for manpower planners the change in cost for
incremental changes in accessions.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This analysis does not address all 13 cotamissioning
sources of Naval officers. Since the percentage of
commissions from the sources other than USNA, NROTC, and OCS
are small (the largest being nine percent from a single source
in fiscal year 1989), excluding these sources, and all of
4
their costs, will not bias the results of this analysis.
Table 1.1 presents accession percentages by source for fiscal
year 1989.
TABLE 1.1 FrY-1989 RELATIVE MIX -F NAVY OFFICER ACCESSIONS.
Source Nuniber/Percentaoe of Accessions
U.S. Naval Academy 958 (15%)
NROTC 1618 (25%)










Officer Cadet) 106 (2%)
Merchant Marine Recall 33 (.5%)
From enlisted 583 (9%)
The following sources are used primarily for medical
accessions:
Recall 235 (3%)
Interservice Transfer 30 (.5%)
Direct Procurement 710 (11%)
s t u d e n t o p t i o n .. .... . ... . 5 8 8 ( 9 % )
Total 6554 (100%)
Source: Statement of Mrs. Barbara S. Pope, Assistant Secretary
of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), before the Manpower
and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 4 April 1990.
o-- --------- S. - m -- - -- - ---- Wn - n n n n--
Also, it is not the intention of this study to determine
the optimal or preferred mix of officer accessions from the
three major sources. This would require an intensive analysis
of all of the factors previously discussed, an analysis of all
the pertinent constraints, and the specific goals of
5
Congressional and Defense leaders. Linear programming models,
such as the one used by Kleinman and Goudreau, discussed in
the next chapter, could be used to determine the optimal
accession mix, but such an effort is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
The analysis in this thesis is limited to the specific
economic costs of producing officers. It does not analyze the
non-economic costs of producing commissioned officers from a
particular source. These would include the impact on the
number of nuclear surface/submarine commissions, the possible
reduction in opportunity for enlisted personnel to become
officers, the effect on the Navy' 3 minority accession targets,
the possible effect of reduced visibility on college campuses
(if NROTC units were closed), and the political implications
(Congress, constituents, lobby groups) of reducing a
particular source. An accurate, well developed study of these
particular areas, though important, is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
This analysis assumes that no com issioning source will be
completely eliminated. While it is clear that options such as
closing the Naval Academy and NROTC units would aeve the
Department of Defense considerable money, the political
ramifications of such major decisions are beyond this
analysis.
6
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter two provides a review of the relevant literature
and builds the theoretical framework for the marginal cost
analysis. Chapter three includes a discussion of the data,
and a discussion of the methodology used to generate the
results. Chapter four provides the results of the analysis,
and the marginal cost estimates associated with changes in the
number of graduates from each commissioning source. Chapter
five draws conclusions and recouuendations based on these
results, and recommends areas of further research.
7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEMORK
A. BACKGROUND
Each conmnissioning program has evolved to fill a different
need. Each also trains officers in quite a different way, yet
the officers must be able to perform in the same arena and
accomplish the same missions. Before 1845, new Naval officers
received most of their training at sea in the fleet. An
increasing requirement for more qualified junior officers and
specifically, engineers, lead to the establishment of the
Naval Academy in 1845.
Through World War I, most Naval officers received their
commissions from the Naval Academy. Congress authorized the
Navy to establish the NROTC college program in 1925 to provide
educated reserve officers to the fleet. During World War II,
the Navy concentrated on training officers instead of
providing an education. However, by the end of the war, Navy
leadership determined that more technically-educated officers
would be needed. Rear Admiral James Holloway was appointed to
chair a board to recoimmend to the Navy an encompassing "method
of educating Naval officers." The Holloway plan, as it was
called, recoumended a plan for acquiring "regular" officers
from 52 civilian colleges and universities. ERef. 4]
In 1946, Congress authorized the NROTC scholarship
program. This program, in conjunction with the Naval Academy,
S
"provided the flexibility necessary to meet the inevitable
fluctuations in the number of officers required and the
capability of obtaining a sufficient number of civilian-
educated naval officers." [Ref. 4:p. 3] The NROTC program has
expanded to its current size of 66 colleges and universities.
At the start of the Korean War, the Navy established the
Officer Candidate School program to supplement the other
programs. With this being the Navy's first "post-college
procurement program," it provided a large bank of college-
educated people that required a relatively short training
period to become officers. ERef. 4 :p. 3]
The Military Manpower Training Report, prepared every
fiscal year by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Force Management and Personnel), discusses officer
acquisition, and training programs. it states that the "mix
of officer acquisition programs used must recognize the
differing characteristics of each source." ERef. 5:p. IV-4]
The Naval Academy represents a program with a long lead-time
that supplies constant input levels to the active duty officer
corps. It provides "high academic quality with comprehensive
military indoctrination." ERef. 5;p. IV-41 NROTC, likewise,
provides consistent input levels, with a majority of
midshipmen joining the reserve components of the service. The
NROTC scholarship program offers a four-year scholarship,
provides student pay and allowances over the length of the
scholarship, and inicludes three summer training cruises in the
9
fleet. The NROTC college program only provides student pay
and allowances over the last two years of college, and has
only one summer cruise. Barbara Pope, in a statement before
the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, emphasized these two programs. She stated
that:
although the education of the individual is a major
benefit of the USNA and NROTC programs, this is not
what makes them unique. Instead, it is the
development of a cadre professional military
officer force deeply imbued with the highest
traditions and heritage of the Naval service,
dedicated to a career of service to their country.
[Ref. 1:p. 1]
OCS, on the other hand, is a 16-week, flexible commissioning
source that can quickly respond to increases or decreases in
the quantity of officers demanded.
Previous research on the costs of commissioning sources is
limited. Robert Hale's testimony before the Senate Manpower
subcommittee was based on research conducted at the
Congressional Budget Office. This testimony discussed the
mFjor differences in costs among commissioning sources. An
NROTC graduate costs approximately one-quarter to one-third as
much as an academy graduate. Some reasons for this include:
many NRO1C students attend schools that cost less to operate
than USNA, and USNA incurs costs that other colleges do not.
These costsi include: pay for students, mandatory summer
training programs, clothing, room and board, complete military
instruction, and an intensive engineering program. Though the
NROTC program incurs some of these costs -- student pay and
10
allowances, military instruction, and summer cruises -- USNA
devotes more assets to these functions. OCS costs are the
smallest of the three, approximately six to 13 percent as much
as a USNA graduate and one-quarter to one-third as much as an
NROTC scholarship. Two major reasons for this are the
relatively short duration of the OCS program, and the fact
that OCS does not provide a college education. [Ref. 3:pp. 7-
8]
In a 1977 study, Samuel Kleinman and Karen Goudreau
constructed a linear programming model to solve for the
optimal number of accessions from each source. They used
fiscal 1976 costs from nine accession points. In their model,
they found that six of the nine commissioning programs
consistently entered their optimal mix of accession programs.
Those six were USNA, NROTC, OCS, Aviation OCS, Naval Flight
OCS, and the Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program..
The objective of their model was to "minimize officer costs
subject to the constraint that for each designation, the
required number of officers at each rank is met within limits
to program adjustments." (Ref. 4:p. 6] They state that their
research was the first comprehensive study of officer
recruitment programs. It appears that none have been
conducted since.
,"rhe Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program is no longer
in existence.
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Kleinman and Goudreau's estimations of precommissioning
training costs were computed separately for each commissioning
source because they were unable to perfectly match the
individual cost elements of the different sources. They
discounted costs back to what they called the "decision
point," defined as four years prior to commissioning. The
data they received from the Navy was undiscounted. Kleinman
and Goudreau believed that the Navy's policy of "growing their
own" force required using a discount rate that reflects the
"opportunity cost of foregone investments." They used a
discount rate of ten percent. [Ref. 4:p. 103 For USNA and
NROTC, programs with expenditures throughout the year, costs
were discounted from the middle of the year. For OCS, they
assumed that costs were expended just prior to commissioning.
By using discounted and undiscounted data sets, they confirmed
through their analysis that for discount rates up to ten
percent. accession levels obtained from their linear program
"are unchanged," and "insensitive" to discounting [Ref. 4:p.
143.
Kleinman and Goudreau divided costs at USNA into 39
categories under the major groups of instructional activi'ies,
student-related activities, instructional support, and Marine
instructor support. Costs were measured for the fiscal year
1976 class by taking the average cost per graduate. The NROTC
costs were divided into the following categories: direct
support, unit costs, command costs, and miscellaneous Costs.
12
In 1977, OCS was a 19-week program and the costs were based on
the man-months of training. Costs associated with OCS were
divided into military pay, operations and maintenance, major
projects, hospital, housing, equipment maintenance, staff
permanent change of station, student travel, and student pay
and allowances.
For each of the commissioning sources, the cost of
commissioning one officer through the program was listed.
This was an average, not a marginal, cost. The fiscal year
1976 average cost of commissioning an of ticer through USNA was
$83,428, through NROTC (scholarship) $27,285, NROTC (non-
scholarship) $22,093, and through OCS, $6,343. Based on their
study, Kleinman and Goudreau recommended that the minimum
service requirement be extended from three to four years for
the NROTC College Program. Though this did not allow the
NROTC College Program to be included in the optimal mix of
accession sources# they did compute that this recommendation
would save the Navy $1.2 to $1.6 million if the supply of
those officers decreased from 125 to 100.
A potential weakness in this study is the fact that the
retention and promotion rates used were based on historical
data. If one assuraes that it is possible to accurately
determine these rates in this fashion, these rates would only
be realistic if the factors influencing officers to remain in
the Navy, and the selection criteria used by the promotion
selection boards do not change. This is unlikely. The
13
quality of officers being accepted is also not included in the
analysis. This quality may be affected by social and economic
trends external to the Navy. The exclusion of these factors
also may have influenced the outcome of the analysis.
Also in 1977. an indepth study was conducted by Barrow, at
the Center for Naval Analyses, on the costs of 1976 NROTC
graduates by school. While the data are outdated, the
procedure used is sound. The costs were accumulated by cohort
as the costs were incurred. For example, if the total amount
spent in scholarships in fiscal year 1989 were $2,000,000 and
the freshmen scholarship students comprised 20 percent of the
total scholarship students, then 20 percent of $2,000,000
would be charged to the freshmen class. The same ptocedure is
used as they became sophomores, juniors and seniors. The
individual amounts are then summed to represent that
particular cohort's total cost. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
The study grouped costs into three general headings:
direct student costs, unit costs, and headquarters costs. The
CNA study found that unit costs were related to the number of
NROTC units, but not student enrollment within the unit.
Therefore, if the number of students were to increase or
decrease by a small amount, there would be no change in
overall commissioning costs. He found headquarters costs to
be even less "sensitive' to the number of students or the
number of units. Therefore, in a marginal cost study, these
costs would be treated as fixed costs. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
14
CNA did not include the cost of student attrition in its
analysis because "student flow into and between the
Scholarship and College programs made it virtually impossible
to estimate." [Ref. 6:p. 3] However, CNA devised a formula
that it used as a proxy for the scholarship attrition rate.
CNA's results are the fiscal 1976 cost-per-commissionee at
each of the 58 NROTC units then in existence. CNA's results
are illustrated in Table 2.1 as a percentage of the average
program-wide costs listed in the table.
On 11 June 1990, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood
requested, at the urging of Congress, that the Department of
Defense prepare a report that addresses three specific areas
concerning futu:e commissioning programs: "reducing costs;
ensuring a proper mix of backgrounds. skills, and experience
in the officer corps; and maintaining a sound force structure,
with no hollowing of the force." ERef. 7:p. 13
This report recommended four principle actions. The first
recommendation was to reduce the size of the entering classes
at the Naval Academy to 1,100 midshipmen, graduating between
750 and 800 per year. This will result in a reduction of
approximately 200 to 250 commissions per year, or roughly 25
to 33 percent. Table 2.2 shows the number of graduates from
the Naval Academy each year since.1946. The mean number of
graduates since 1946 has been 891.
The second recommendation wvs to modify the faculty mix at
the Kilitary and air Force Academies by increasing the number
15
TABLE 2.1 PERCENTAGE OF 1976 AVERAGE COST (ADJUSTED FOR
INFLATION) PER NROTC COMKISSIONEE BY UNIT.
Total average cost per graduate unadjusted for inflation:
$25,174
Total average cost per graduate adjusted for inflation:
$28,732
NROTC unit Percentace NROTC unit Percentaae
Auburn 63 Northwestern 234
Berkeley 132 Notre Dame 129
Citadel 58 Ohio State 61
Colorado 107 Oklahoma 129
Cornell 140 Oregon State 76
Duke 138 Pennsylvania 92
Florida 186 Penn State 85
Florida a&M 117 Prairie View 81
Georgia Tech 94 Purdue 109
Holy Cross 131 Rensselaer 143
Idaho 85 Rice 182
Illinois 102 Rochester 121
TIT 70 Savannah State 118
Iowa State 91 South Carolina 77
Jacksonville 110 Southern A&M 82
Kansas 142 Suny Maritime 111
Louisville 99 Texas 104
Maine Maritime 41 Texas AM 84
Marquette 265 Tulane 119
MIT 129 UCLA 131
Miami 80 USC 127
Michigan 104 Utah 102
Minnesota 72 Vanderbilt 97
Mississippi 78 Villanova 92
Missouri 57 Virginia 77
Nebraska 157 VH! (1) --
New Mexico 82 Washington 63
North Carolina 103 West Florida 307
North Carolina Central 377 Wisconsin 104
Source: Costs of 1976 UROTC Comissionees By School, & CNA
Study
notes:
(1) VMI is a new unit that did not CooMision any
officers in 1976.
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of civilian professors, and to consolidate the different
service preparatory schools into one "joint" school. Third,
during the period 1992 to 1996, it was recommended that ROTC
commissions, across all services, be reduced by 19 percent.
Fourth, the report recommended maintaining OCB commissioning
output at current levels, and increasing the program as
necessary to meet any unexpected shortages. [Ref. 7:p. cover
sheet] To provide insight into the relative mix from all
accessions sources across the services, Table 2.3 provides the
trend for the last 10 years.
The DOD report states that current (1990) projections for
new commissions in 1997 Vill be 2,327 below the 1990 level, or
a decrease of 9.2 percent. However, the report also states
that these accession projections may be "inconsistent" with
the actual end-strength prograuned for fiscal year 1997.
The Department of Defense expects'that the future projections
of officer end-strength will decrease even more as world
events evolve., The report's recomendations., therefore, are
based on ofticer recruitment of 2,277 below the current
projections for 1995, the projected date of completion of the
force drawdown. (Reg. 7tp. 6]
DOD anticipates savings through reduced officer accessions
in two areas. first, midshipmen pay and allowances, and the
costs associated with support and scholarships are expected to
decline. Savings "will be realized by reducing the number of
students enrolled and by shifting the mix towards the low-cost
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TABLE 2.2 SIZE Or NAVAL ACA!lKY GRADUATING CLASSES.
Class Size Clas Lze Class Size
1946 1046 1961 796 1976 831
1947 820 1962 789 1977 967
1948 910 1963 886 1978 986
1949 790 1964 925 1979 932
1950 691 1965 801 1980 946
1951 725 1966 868 1981 966
1952 783 1967 889 1982 1030
1953 925 1968 836 1983 1077
1954 855 1969 879 1984 1004
1955 742 1970 838 1985 1044
1956 681 1971 874 1986 1029
1957 848 1972 905 1987 1036
1958 899 1973 891 1988 1060
1959 796 1974 919 1989 1082
1960 798 1975 811
Source: Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 10
August 1990, "Review of Programs for Obtaining Officers for
the Armnd Forces."
----------------------------------------------------
-- - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - --------A. C C C C C C C C C C C
TABLE 2.3 PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS COMMISSIONED BY TRAININGPROORA.
Calendar Year AcademO TKC OCS/OTS
1980 9 25 28
1981 9 26 25
1932 9 30 20
1983 9 31 23
1964 11 36 19
1985 10 34 24
1986 11 31 23
1987 12 34 18
1988 13 38 13
1989 12 37 12
Source: Data supplied by Department of Defense
Table provided by Robert F. Hale's, Assistant Director
National Security Division, Congressional budget
Office, testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower
and Perscnel Committee on Armed Services, United
States Senate, 4 April 1990.
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because nunbers exclude
direct appointments (lawyers, doctors, etc.), warrant
officers, and others. Also, CBO percentages reported here are





sources such as OCS, and NROTC non-scholarship." [Ref. 7:pp.
6-73 Second, indirec- costs will be less (e.g., faculty and
staff, fixed overhead, and other institutional support costs).
The largest savings are derived from reduced enrollments.
Additional savings stem from the increased civilian-to-
military instructor ratio, and the consolidation of the
academy preparatory schools into one location. Total savings
are almost $700 million across the services, or ten percent of
total officer acquisition costs in the POM (Program Objective
Memoranda) for fisccl years 1992 through 1996. [Ref. 7:pp. 6-
7]
The DOD report prepared its savings estimates by
calculating the marginal cost of graduating an officer through
each of the service academies. Using the Army Manpower Cost
System, in fiscal year 1991 dollars, the marginal cost of
graduating an Army officer through the Military Academy is
$101,000. The marginal cost of graduating a Naval officer
through the Naval Academy is "only about $35,000 per
graduate." [Ref. 7zp. 2 of Tab D] This report states that
most of the difference between the U.S. Military Academy and
the U.S. Naval Academy were due to differences in the military
personnel account, and that the Navy's facility training costs
were treated as fixed, therefore eliminated (Ref. 7:p. 3 of
Tab D]. This is a questionable assumption, as the facility
training costs are not all fixed. Reducing student enrollment
while maintaining current faculty-to-student ratios would also
19
entail a reduction in faculty. If this option was exercised,
then some of the faculty expenses would also be variable.
The expected NROTC savings were based on the Congressional
Budget Office average cost study completed in June of 1990.
This formed the basis of Hale's testimony before Congress,
which was discussed earlier [Ref. 7:p. 4 of Tab D3. This
procedure appears to be inconsistent with the methodology of
a marginal cost analysis used by DOD to determine academy
costs. The DOD study's results are shown in Table 2.4.
TABLE 2.4 SUMMARY OF NAVY OFFICER ACCESSIONS SAVINGS IN Fy-91
DOLLARS (S.00s).
FY92 ff 93 "9 E M 2TU
reduced USNA
graduates 2,727 5,980 8,589 11,971 11,971 41,237
restructure
NROTC 4,819 9,638 14,457 19,277 19,277 67,468
Source: Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 10
August 1990, "Review of Programs for Obtaining Officers for
the Armed Forces."
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The major contribution of this thesis is to provide a
different perspective on accession point costs. Specifically,
the concept of marginal cost is compared to average cost.
Before an understanding of the difference betwen these two
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concepts can be achieved, underlying definitions must be
developed. If one thinks of commissioning officers as a
production process, and the costs of commissioning them as
input costs, then the established theory of cost and
production in microeconomics can be applied to the
conuissioning process.
Any production process can generally be divided into long-
run and short-run periods of time. In the long-run, all
inputs into the process, such a3 capital and labor, are
considered variable and change as the quantity of output
changes. Tn the long-run, the coats associated with changes
in all inputs are also variable in nature, and thus depend on
the output level. The short-run is a period of time during
which certain inputs, and their associated costs, cannot be
physically changed regardless of the amount of output
produced. For example, the physical plant associated with an
operation is usually fixed in size over most ranges of output.
Costs associated with these fixed inputs are considered fixed
costs because they can only be altered in the long-run.
It is appropriate to define the short-run and long-run
cost components because this w3ll accurately illustrate to
Defense leaders, who must make force reduction decisions, what
each decision will save in terms of dollars. In the short-
run, due to the short duration and flexibility of the program,
it is believed that OCS will be the source of adjustments in
officer accessions. This statement is confirmed in a letter
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from Vice Admiral Boorda, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Manpoper, Personnel and Training), to the Superintendent of
the Naval Academy concerning fiscal year 1990 officer
accessions [Ref. 8]. All future beginning classes at the
Naval Academy and NROTC colleges and universities will be
considered for reductions.
In using economic decision aids, one must consider the
relevant costs of production. These are defined as "any cost
that actually affects a given decision and therefore should be
considered in the decision process." Sunk costs are those
"that are not affected by a specific decision and therefore
irrelevant to that decision." The concepts of "increment,"
"relevant," and "variable" costs are all closely related to
the concept of "marginality." [Ref. 9]
In general, economic costs are defined in terms of
opportunity costs. Pappas and Hirschey state that opportunity
cost is "the value of a resource in its best alternative use."
ERef. 9] This important economic concept is crucial to the
development of production decision-making, because if
production costs are greater than opportunity costs, an
organization or firm would stop producing. Opportunity costs
will be determined by Navy policy.
Short-run total cost is the sum of the fixed costs and
variable costs. In the short-run, the only way output can be
changed is to alter the variable inputs. Long-run total cost
is the sum of all relevant costs. Average total cost (average
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cost) is the total of all fixed and variable costs divided by
the output (total costs of a commissioning source divided by
the number of graduates for a given year equals the cost per
graduate). Marginal cost is "the change in total cost per
unit change in output." (Ref. 10] The unit of output in this
case would be a coMnissioned officer. The marginal cost would
be the increase (or decrease) in total cost that occurs when
one more (less) student graduates. Marginal cost takes into
account that fixed costs cannot be altered in the short-run.
The fixed costs include, for example, operating facilities
which would still exist if there was a reduction by one
officer. Marginal cost is derived by taking the derivative of
the total cost equation. The total cost equation takes on the
form of:
TCV VC()
where TC is the total cost of a comuissioning source, PC is
the total fixed costs, VC is the total variable costs, and Q
is the number of graduates for a given year. The derivative
of a constant (PC) with respect to Q is zero. The derivative





d(7c) a d(VC(O)) =aglnalcso
d dQ
Therefore, fixed costs do not play a roll .n marginal cost
functions in the short-run. In the long-run, however, it is
important to remember that all inputs and, therefore, all
costs are variable.
The following example will illustrate the theoretical
framework. Hale's study states that the average cost of a
USNA graduate is $153,000. By definition, the $153,000
includes some fixed costs. The USNA Comptroller office
reported to the author of this thesis that the academy is
designed for approximately 3,700 midshipmen at a given time,
and the usual enrollment can reach as high as 4,500 midshipmen
without the need for additional facilities. Thus, fixed
facility costs for Bancroft Hall, the Midshipmen dormitory,
remain the same with an additional 800 students present.
Therefore, if accessions were cut by 800 for a given year,
these fixed facility costs would remain the same and only
variable costs and some minor fixed costs would change. [Ref.
11] Average cost per graduate, in this case, would overstate
the relevant marginal cost figure because fixed facility costs
have not changed.
C. PROBDBILITIC BUDMOTS
While all of the cost calculations in this thesis are
based on previous years' data, using these precise results for
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future years may be misleading. Fixed and variable cost
components often vary by relatively small dollar amounts from
year to year. The construction of cost estimates that contain
expected values, and a probability interval, or confidence
interval, provides a more accurate representation of the range
within which the true cost figure is likely to be found.
In 1970, William L. Ferrara and Jack C. Hayya published an
article in the journal, Kanagement Accounting, entitled
"Toward Probabilistic Profit Budgets," in which they developed
the idea of creating a confidence interval for each of the
elements of a budget. They first presented the idea of
determining an optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely value
of each element. From these values, using either probability-
tree analysis or PERT (Program Evaluation and Review
Technique) formulas, the mean and standard deviation of an
element could be determined. From these statistically
descriptive characteristics, a probability interval can be
determined using statistical probability tables.
Ferrara and Hayya conclude that the "probability interval
... tells us that a stated percentage of the distribution of
a budget item falls within a given range. Thus the
probability interval serves as a measure of variability for
the budget item." ERef. 12]
Ideally, confidence intervals would be calculated for the
estimates of marginal cost presented in this thesis. However,
one would need several years of data to construct these
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intervals. Since data was only collected for one graduating
class, it is impossible to calculate confidence intervals in
this case. However, as long as this data are representative
of typical commissioning source operations, the values of
marginal cost that are obtained should be within the intervals
for larger samples.
D. ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Pappas and Hirschey define economies of scale as
"production or marketing advantages that lead to a decline in
long-run average costs." [Ref. 9:p. 257] Maurice and Smithson
further elaborate on this concept by stating that with
increasing returns to scale, there is a decline in the average
cost curve, and with decreasing returns to scale, there is an
increase in the average cost curve. They illustrate the
concept with the following example. If an organization
doubled its output, and the increase in the input level is
less than double, than average cost will fall. However, if an
organization is operating in a range of decreasing returns to
scale, also known as diseconomies of scale, doubling output
will require more than two times as much input, and, average
cost will rise. They state that as "the size of plant and the
scale of operation become larger, ceratin economies of scale
are usually realized." (Ref. 10:pp. 289-290]
No previous studies have been identified that conduct
research on the possibilities of economies of scale at USNA,
NROTC, or OCS. One may argue that by reducing the number of
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midshipmen at the Naval Academy, though marginal cost may be
lower than average cost, the average cost will rise because
the number of graduates per year will decrease, making the
denominator of the average cost calculation smaller. However,
because of economies of scale, an increase in average cost may
not always occur. Mathematically, long run average cost is
defined as:
LRATV=.M - CgQ 0
where TC is total cost, VC is variable cost, and Q is the
number of graduates.
Typically, long-run total costs (hence long-run variable
costs) increase as production increases. If total cost
increases faster than production, long-run average total costs
increase and there are decreasing returns to scale. On the
other hand, if economies of scale exist, it may be possible to
increase production, the number of graduates, and reduce long-
run average total costs. If the long-run total cost grows at
a slower rate than output, thn the long-run average cost of
a graduate would decrease. There have been at least four
studies conducted that have shown some degree of economies of
scale in private and public education systems. Most recently,
Scott J. Callan and Reaford E. Santerre conducted a study
using the 165 school districts in Connecticut. Their results
suggest that a "ten percent increase in primary and secondary
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school quality-adjusted enrollments would individually result
in a .9 percent and 1.1 percent increase in variable costs,
all else equal." [Ref. 13] This result shows that partial
economies of scale exist in Connecticut, and that "educational
cost savings might be achieved through further consolidation
of primary and secondary school districts." [Ref. 13]
Bee and Dolton, in their study on costs and economies of
scale in the United Kingdom's private schools, use linear
regression analysis to show that "there may be considerable
fixed costs in school operation and that there are
considerable economies of scale in the operation of fairly
large schools due to continually declining cost curves."
Their two main findings are that school sZe is negatively
correlated with average cost, which suggests that economies of
scale are present, and that "no obvious relationship between
performance and average cost is revealed." [Ref. 14]
Kumar, in his analysis of economies of scale in school
operations in Canada, strongly believes that the "importance
of economies of scale studies of school costs can hardly be
overemphasized in a period of generally contracting school
systems." Using Watt's 1980 study of economies of scale from
the private sector, Kumar develops a general methodology for
investigating economies of scale. He uses linear regression
techniques to estimate average cost curves that fit the form
of AC f (8, XIX 2 , ... Q. p1,p, .... p.) where S is the
site of the educational system, X,,X 2. ..... 1, are exogenous
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factors that may account for differences among nits under
study, Q is the quality of education output, and plp2, ...
p. are the prices of educational inputs. He then states that
there are two major problems with estimating this equation:
the selection of the appropriate functional form, and
measuring the quality of education. Kumar states that the
cononly accepted procedure is to select a quadratic function
of S. and create a variable that accounts for differences in
the quality of education. This leads to the following form:
ACz E f
The first sunnation is over all of the different exogenous
factors that may account for differences among the units under
study. The second sumation is over all of the differences in
the quality of education. Kumar's results show that in "19750
1976, and 1977, the board could have saved respectively $74,
$99, and $168 per student by increasing average school site by
100 students." (Ref. 15]
Because of the magnitude of the fixed inputs at the Naval
Academy, there is a strong possibility that economies of scale
exist. This would play a significant role in estimating
savings obtained by increasing or decreasing student
enrollment. Since an analysis of this magnitude is beyond the
scope of this thesis, it is strongly recomnended that further
research be conducted on economies of scale.
29
III. DATA AND METBODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the d&ta, and
discuss the specific methodology that is used to determine the
marginal cost per graduate for each couuissioning source.
A. DATA
There are three primary data sources for this thesis: the
Naval Academy Comptroller's office; the Chief of Naval
Education and Training, code N-11; and the Chief of Naval
Education and Training Program Management Support Activity
(NETPMSA).
1. U.S. Naval Academy
Naval Academy expenditures are divided into three
categories: operations and Maintenance, Navy Labor (O&MN);
Operations and Maintenance, Navy Material (O&MI); and
Military Pay Navy (1PN). There are 38 standard cost functions
that are used by the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Air Force
Academy, and the U.S. Naval Academy. Each of these cost
functions are further divided into subfunctions, each
receiving funding from O&M.N labor, O&k,N material, and MPH.
As an example, the fiscal year 1989 cost figures for each
function are shown in Table 3.1. Appendix A includes a table
of fiscal year 1989 cost figures by subfunctions, and tables
of fiscal years 1986 through 1988 cost figures by function.
Past fiscal year data will be necessary to compute the
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TABLE 3.1 7-Tr1989 NAVAL ACADEMY COSTS (DOLLARS) BY FUN CTION.
Functions Tot-al Cost
1. Academic Dean $ 40,897,960
2. Audio/Visual Support 858,871
3. Academic Computer Center 3,247,524
4. Faculty Training (1)
5. Military Training 22,082,446
6. Physical Education 3,697,935
7. Library 2,833,757
TOTAL INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES 73,618,493
8. Cadet/Midshipmen Mes3 6.514,775
9. Student Services 1,602,471
10. Registrar 2,787,200
11. Student Pay and Allowances 35,094,969
TOTAL STUDENT RELATED ACTIVITY 45,999,415
12. Medical 4,503,765
13. Band 1,131,628
14. Printing Plant (2)
15. Admin Data Processing (3)
16. Civilian Personnel 1,160,583
17. Personnel Administration 2,154,041
18. Special Services 277,959
19. Other Personnel Services 1,077,716
20. Utility Services 7,522,468
21. Custodial Services 2,989,576
22. Fir. Protection 1,412,555
23. maintenance andtEngineering 22,808,777
24. Communications 1,674,747
25. Trans. 0ps, and Equip, Maintenance 1,765,978
26. Commissary and Food Services 757,910
27. Supply and Services Operations 2,601,907
28. Logistics Activities (4)
29. ComptrolLer 1,875,105
30. Security 3,572,629
31. Prep School 5,909,839
32. PCS Travel (5)
33. Military Support Unit 243,258
34. Museum 197.820
35. PAO (6) 1,044,031
36. Commnand and Staff 1,206,711
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TABLE 3.1 FY-1989 NAVAL ACADEKY COSTS (DOLLARS) BY FUNCTION
CONTINUED.
Functions Total Cost
37. All Other Functions (7)
38. Stewart Army Annex (8)
Total Institutional Support 65,889,083
TOTAL COST FOR FY-1989 IS: $ 185,506,991
Source: USNA Comptroller's Office
Notes:
(1) Other service academies fund their military faculty to get
a Master's degree before they become instructors. Naval
officers come to USNA with their degree, funded by other
means.
(2) Other service academies have their own printing plant.
USNA acquires its printing services through the Navy Printing
Publication Office (NPPSO). Funding for these services comes
from the departmental O&M,N material category.
(3) These costs are included in function 3.
(4) This category is considered a Supply activity for the
Navy. This is used for Army and Air Force.
(5) Omitted for USNA. These permanent change of station (PCS)
costs used to be retrieved from the Personnel Support
Detachment (POD) for incoming and outgoing military personnel.
However, the Comptroller department found that this was a
double count because the Composite Rate Table from NAVCOMPNOTE
7041 shows that PCS costs are paid through military pay and
therefore, spread throughout the K1N category of the 38
functions.
(6) Public Affairs Office
(7) This function is used by the other service academies only.
(8) This functiot, is used by the U.S. Military Academy only.
--------- ------ - ---- - " W -- - - -- -
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composite fiscal year 1989 marginal cost per graduate. This
data has been confirmed by the Government Accounting Office
via audits performed during the summer of 1990. Thus, the
data from the Naval Academy are considered reliable and used
as the basis for computing marginal cost.
2. Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps
NROTC funding is divided into the following
categories: Military Pay, Navy (MPN); Reserve Personnel, Navy
(RPN); and Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N). The MPN
account funds the Navy staffing (Professors of Naval Science)
at the NROTC units. The RPN account funds uniforms,
midshipmen travel for summer training cruises, naval science
textbooks, and student pay/subsistence of $100 per month for
up to ten months per year. The O&M,N account funds tuition
costs and program/unit costs. The latter consists of special
procurement costs, civilian staff salaries, travel for staff
members, and telephone expenses. Tuition is paid onli for the
full scholarship program, and varies per university. NROTC
pays both in-state and out-of-state tuition rates, depending
on the particular student's home of record. Besides tuition,
the four-year scholarship program provides $100 per month
subsistence pay, all books, and uniforms. The college program
does not cover tuition, but does cover naval science books,
certain lab fees, uniforms, and the $100 subsistence payment
for the last two years. The Chief of Naval Education and
Training does not segregate costs into scholarship and non-
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scholarship. Therefore, the cost figures provided in Table
3.2 are combined. The Navy does not pay for the use of
university buildings or utilities, which constitute much of
the fixed, overhead costs at the Naval Academy. The campuses
treat the NROTC unit as a division of the school and provide
faculty members for instruction in non-ROTC courses,
secretarial support, and computer support. Table 3.3 provides
the fiscal year 1989 accessions from each NROTC unit.
TABLE 3.2 Fy-1989 NROTC PROGXM COSTS (S 000s).
MPN





- naval science textbooks 17,158
OI(,N
- tuition costs 46,337
- program/unit operations 7,082
TOTAL $ 97,527
Source: Chief of Naval Education and Training (Code N-I)
- --------------- -- --------------- ---------- W--- - -- --- - ---- e-f-
3. Officer Candidate School
OCS funding is divided into three categories:
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N); Military Pay, Navy
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(MPN); and Student Pay and Allowances. Table 3.4 provides a
breakdown of the cost categories within the three funding
TABLE 3.3 FY-1989.NROTC PRODUCTION BY UNIT,
NRITC UNIT TOTAL ACCESSIONS
University of Arizona 35
Auburn University 63
Boston Uaiversity 33
University of California (Berkeley) 40
University of Caifornia (Los Angeles) 23
Carnegie Mellon University 0
The Citadel 33
University of Colorado 39
Cornell University 43
Duke University 30
University of Florida 28
Florida A&M University 20
George Washington University 39
Georgia Institute of Technology 23
Hampton Roads Consortium (1) 40
The College of The Holy Cross 30
University of Idaho 25
Illinois Institute of Technology 19
University of Illinois 28
Iowa Otate University 31
Jackson,ille University 21
University of Kansas 17
Maine Maritime Academy 20
Marquette University 34
Massachusette Institute of Technology 36
Memphis State University 11
Miami University 24
University of Michigan 24
University of Minnesota 20
University of Mississippi 5
University of Missocri 29
Morehouse College 17
University of Nebrajla 17
University of New Meximo 13
University of North Carolina 47
Northwestern Univerzity 44
Norwich University 33
University of Notre Dame 55
Ohio State University 42
University of Oklahoma 29
--------------------
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TABLE 3.3-F Y-19S9 NROTC PRODUCTION BY UNIT CONTINUED.
NROTC UNIT TOTAL ACCESSIONS
Oregon State University 32
University of Pennsylvania 32
Pennsylvania State University 56
Prairie View A&M University 6
Purdue University 29
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 47
Rice University 8
University of Rochester 57
San Diego Consortium (2) 39
Savannah State College 5
University of South Carolina 23
University of Southern California 30
Southern University and A&M College 9
State University of NY Maritime College 13
University of Texas 24
Texas &M, University 51
Tulane University 25
University of Utah 17
Vanderbilt University 26
Villanova University 60
University of Virginia 41
Virginia Military Institute 54
Virginia Polytechnic Institute 37
University of Washington 53
University of Wisconsin 26
Texas Technical University 11
TOTAL: 1,971
Source: Chief of Naval Education and Training (Code N-11)
Notes:
(1) Hampton Roads Consortium consists of Hampton University,
Norfolk State University, and Old Dominion University. These
three universities constitute one NROTC unit.
(2) The San Diego Consortium consists of the University of San
Diego and San Diego State University. These two universities
constitute one NROTC unit.
categories for fiscal year 1989. OCS is a part of the Naval
Education and Training Center (NETC) in Newport, Rhode Island.
NETC's fixed overhead costs (base support) are shared with
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several training commands. These traiuing activities include:
Officer Candidate School, Officer Indoctrination School, Naval
Academy Preparatory School (NAPS)2, NETC Instructor Training
School, Chaplain's School, Communications School, the Senior
Enlisted Academy, and International OCS. Table 3.4 lists the
prorated share of these costs assigned to OCS. CNET prorates
these costs based on the number of reported man-months of
training per training activity.
OCS reports the man-months of training it conducts to
the Chief of Naval Education and Training Program Management
Support Activity (NETPMSA) by means of the Navy Integrated
Training Resource Administration System (NITARS).3  This
system is a software package that provides NETPMSA with the
number of man-months of training performed. In fiscal year
1989, a discrepancy exists in the number of graduates reported
from the OCS program. OCS reports that 1,233 people entered
the program, and 974 people graduated. NETPMSA reports that
the "equivalent number of graduates" is 723.75. NETPMSA
arrives at this figure in the following manner. First, the
number of man-months of training for the entire fiscal year,
as reported by OCS (2,766 man months), is multiplied by a
2As of 1 October 1990, NaPS has been removed from NETC's
budget and placed on the Naval Academy's budget. Since this thesis
is being used for future decisions, PY-1989 NAPS costs have been
assigned to the Naval Academy instead of NETC.
3 &n-months of training is defined as the sum of the total
students trained per day for a particular month divided by the
total number of instruction days per month.
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conversion factor of 4.333 to estimate the number of man-
weeks of training (11,985). Second, NETPMSA subtracts the
TABLE 3.4 FY-1989 NAVAL EPUCATION TRAINING COMMAND OCS COSTS
(DOLLARS).
Cost Categories O&M,N MPN St.P&A TOTAL
1. Instructional Costs:












Commander Staff 78,145 3,001,216 3,079,361
b. Supplies, material,






Processing (ADP) 125,715 125,715
3. Direct Student Costs:




TABLE 3.4 FY-1989 NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING COMMAND OCS COSTS
(DOLLARS) CONTINUED.




Staff 156,848 189,211 346,059
b. Supply 80,564 17,415 97,999
c. Logistics 6,569 6,569
d. Comptroller 18,068 4,246 22,314
e. Transportation 22,887 22,887
f. Personnel 9,074 9,074




J. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (2)
k. Utilities 616,767 616,767






r. Comnunications 291,522 291,522
a.Miscellaneous 540.281 20.541. 56,.822
TOTALS 3,183,035 3,232,629 6,922,607 13,338,271
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TABL j 3.4 ,Y-1989 NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING COMMAND OCS COSTS
(DOLLARS) CONTINUED.
Source: Chief of Naval Education and Training Program
Management Support Activity
Notes:
(1) This cost category has no dollars associated with it in
the OCS accounting system.
(2) These costs are embedded in the miscellaneous category.
(3) Contract costs appear in the financial reports against
specific expense elements of base functions without
identification of particular contracts. Some functions
are included in miscellaneous costs.
------------------------ w--------------------
number of attrite weeks (405) from the number of training
weeks. This accounts for those students who left the program
at various stages of training but accrued various amounts of
program costs. This yields the final amount of training weeks
(11,580). Third, NETPKSA divides the total number of
remaining training weeks by the number of weeks in the course
(16) to estimate the number of graduates for the fiscal year
(723.75).
This is the figure for the number of graduates that is
used to report all cost per graduate figures provided by
NETPMSA. It is considerably different from the 974 graduates
reported by OCS. One source of error appears to be the amount
of man- months of training reported. The 974 figure appears
most accurate. However, this figure has not been adjusted to
reflect the accrued costs by the people who attrited from the
program at various stages during the 16 weeks. Therefore,
this thesis will use the NETPMSA formula to achieve a new
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equivalent number of graduates based on the final number of
graduates (974) provided by OCS. The 974 graduates are
multiplied by 16 weeks (the course length) to obtain 15,584
training man-weeks. Subtracting 405 attrite-weeks (provided
by NETPMSA) from the total number of training man-weeks
(15,584) yields 15,179 training man-weeks. Dividing this
number by 16 weeks equals 948.69 equivalent number of
graduates. This will be the figure used in the cost
computations in this thesis.
B. MOTHODOLOOT
This thesis adopts the following methodology to obtain the
marginal cost per graduate. First, the total cost of each of
three comunissioning programs is calculated. Second, the
average cost per graduate for each program is calculated.
This is used later for comparison with the marginal cost
calculation. Third, each cost category is identified as being
variable or fixed, or as containing elements of both
categories. The criteria for the decision of whether the cost
is variable, fixed, or both will be based on hypothetical
cases that encompass the continuum from a one graduate change
to incremental changes in the number of graduates. Fourth,
for the Naval Academy, a prorated share of the variable costs
are assigned to a graduating cohort, as discussed previously
in the Barrow study. This is necessary because a graduating
class shares in four fiscal years' of costs. Dividing this
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cumulative total variable cost by the number of graduates
yields the marginal cost per graduate.
Total variable cost divided by the number of graduates, is
average variable cost. This analysis makes the implicit
assumption that the average variable cost equals the marginal
cost for all levels of output. This assumption is valid if
the average productivity of labor and marginal productivity of
labor are constant. The marginal productivity of labor is
defined as "the change in output associated with a unit change
in labor, holding other inputs constant." [Ref. 9:pp. 205-207]
The average productivity of labor is defined as "the total
production output divided by the number of units of labor
employed." [Ref. 9:pp. 205-2073 Thisseems to be a reasonable
assumption because the change in the amount of graduates are
assumzd to be incremental changes. They are not likely to be
large enough to significantly affect the productivity of each
individual unit of labor at each of the commissioning sources.
Because total costs at the Naval Academy consist largely
of fixed costs, the long-run results may be considerably
different. This thesis will attempt to dissect the fixed cost
functions for USNA to determine what costs would become
variable in a five-year time period, it the number of
graduates is reduced to approximately 800 midshipmen per year.
The same procedure discussed above in the short-run analysis,
will be used for this extrapolation into the long-run.
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The methodology used to calculate marginal cost for NROTC
is different in that the cost figures provided by CNET have
been prorated for the four years that the students are
enrolled in the program.4  Also, since the cost data is
combined for the entire program, separate marginal costs for
the scholarship and non-scholarship programs, as well as for
each individual NROTC unit, cannot be calculated. The
marginal cost per graduate will actually differ for each of
the 66 NROTC Scholarship and College programs, based on the
differences in tuition and subsistence pay provided by the
program. If decision makers were attempting to reduce the
number of NROTC units, then individual unit average cost
figures wculd be one important factor to consider in
determining which units to close.
Since the OCS program is 16 weeks long, none of the
courses overlap into another fiscal year in this computation,
it is not necessary to prorate the cost of a class over more
than one fiscal year.
The methodology discussed for each source will be repeated
for incremental changes in the number of graduates to
determine if any savings can be obtained by a change umn the
level of graduates.




This section accomplishes the following tasks: define
which cost categories of each coutissioning program are
variable costs, fixed costs, or both; and determine what the
total cost, average cost and marginal cost per graduate is for
each source.
1. U.S. Naval Academy Short-Run Costs
The following discusses the cost functions in Table
3.1, and the reasoning behind the classification of those
functions as variable, fixed, or both. The academic dean
function is entirely fixed in the short-run. Reductions in
student enrollment will not result in proportional reductions
in faculty. There are 18 majors offered at the Naval Academy.
When a reduction of 200 students, for example, is distributed
over the 18 majors, it averages a reduction of 11 midshipmen
per major. This change will improve the student-to-faculty
ratio, but will not provide reason to reduce faculty.
The audio visual support function only has two
civilian personnel providing service. The remaining support
function is provided by contracting outside the Navy. This
function is a fixed cost. The a,.'ademic computer center
function also is considered fixed. Under the military
training function, the following subfunctions are assumed to
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be variable: the Commandant's staff, which includes battalion
and company officers; midshipmen travel funds; the
professional development and programs department, which
includes military instructors, (this could change because
every midshipmen must take these courses); the leadership and
law department program and instructors, (every midshipmen must
also take these courses); the seamanship and navigation
department; officer and civilian travel; small craft fuel;
weapons training; sail training; fuel operations; and VTNAo
the small plane club (every midshipmen is provided an
opportunity for flying time). Under military training, only
the Commandant's academic administrative subfunction is
considered fixed.
The physical education function is considered as
containing both fixed and variable elements. While the
instructors may not change in the short-run, since they are
spread across several sports# the equipment that the
midshipmen use may charge as enrollment changes. Thus, O&M,N
Material under this function is considered a variable qost.
The remaining outlays are assumed to be fixed. The library
function is a fixed cost. The midshipmen caess function is
considered as a fixed cost. !f 500 midshipmen were eliminated
from the brigade, spread over 36 companies, this would be
equivalent to a reduction of 14 people, or two tables per
company in the ess. At most, in the long-run, this equates
to approximately one fewer server per company. Howevero since
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all food service attendants are contracted from outside the
Navy, the contract will not change, in the short-run. Thus,
this function is fixed.
The student services function has a total of 32
people, which are spread across the following areas:
midshipmen activities, social activities, the midshipmen
store, the Chaplain, and the midshipmen counseling center.
Because the personnel are distributed among these
subfunctions, the numbers per subfunction are too few to
reduce. Therefore, small changes in student enrollment would
not affect the student services function. Therefore, it is
assumed to be a fixed cost.
The registrar is considered a fixed cost. Even if
there are fewer midshipmen, there would also be more intensive
screening of the applicants to select the smaller number of
appointments. The student pay and allowances function is
completely variable. The medical function is considered a
fixed cost. This service is provided not just to midshipmen,
but to service members and their families stationed at the
naval Academy. The band is considered a fixed cost. The
civilian personnel office consists of 21 people. If the 1,627
civilians employed by the academy are reduced by a relatively
small amount, this function will nnt change in the short-run.
However, in the long-run this function may change.
The overall personnel administration function is
considered fixed. The subfunction PSD (Personnel Support
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Detachment) will not change unless there is a significant
reduction in the number of military personnel stationed at the
Academy and the naval station. The naval station subfunctions
are a separate entity from the Academy and will not change
with a change in the number of students enrolled. The
special services function includes eight people and is
unlikely to be reduced any further. This function is
considered fixed. The remaining personnel services function
includes: the equal opportunity office, human goals, safety,
the bachelors officers' quarters (BOQ), the commissioned
officers and faculty club, the enlisted club, the naval
station Chaplain, and the legal office. The 27 personnel,
when spread across these subfunctions, leave just enough
people per subfunction that they cannot be reduced any
further. Because these subfunctions also support more than
just midshipmen, this function is considered fixed.
The utilities and custodial servicen functions are
provided by contractors and are viewed as fixed. The fire
protection, maintenance and engineering, and base
communications functions also are considered fixed costs.
The transportatiou. operations, and equipment maintenance
function is viewed as containing both fixed and variable
elements. The L subfunction, which includes the buses tor
midshipmen transportation is treated a,, variable because the
academy will not require the same amount of buses with a
47
change in the number of midshipmen. Also, bus maintenance is
variable.
The Commissary and food services function is viewed as
a fixed cost. The subfunctions of the Commissary and Navy
Exchange will not change with a change in the number of
students enrolled, for they also provide services to base
military personnel and their families. The supply and
services function is considered fixed with one exception. The
midshipmen laundry services is viewed as a variable cost. The
laundry makes up 7.2 percent of the total cost of this
function. All of the following functions are considered
fixed: comptroller; security; military support unit
(Bachelors Enlisted Quarters); the museum; the public affairs
office; and the command and staff function (which includes the
Commanding Officer of the naval station, and the
Superintendent of the Naval Academy and his personal staff).
The Naval Academy Preparatory School has elements of
both fixed and variable costs. The OaMN and KPN subfunctions
are treated as fixed, while the military pay for students is
viewed as variable. It makes sense that if the Academy is
selecting fewer midshipmen to enter, the preparatory school
would also be reduced in sise. Currently, there is a proposal
by the Department of Defense to consolidate all service
academy preparatory schools into one school. If this occurs,
the costs would likely be prorated to their respective
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academies. Therefore, the preparatory school costs are still
considered relevant.
Appendix A provides all of the Academy data to
estimate the costs for the class of 1989. Appendix B provides
the actual computations. Table 4.1 provides a sunmmary of the
short-run results, These results were obtained by prorating
the total costs of operating the Academy for fiscal years 1986
through 1989 by the percent of the brigade that the class of
1989 represented. For fiscal years 1986, 1987, 1988, and
1989, the percentages are respectively 28.8, 24.9, 23.5, and
23.1. The total fixed costs comprised 63.3 percent of the
total cost associated with the class.
The total variable costs were 36.7 percent. This
confirms that the majority of Naval Academy costs are fixed,
and that a marginal cost analysis is preferred to an average
cost analysis when determining the effects of incremental
changes in the student body. This also provides some
legitimacy to the idea that economies of scale may affect the
long-run average cost. The established fixed costs may allow
for a reduction in the average cost per graduate as the number
of graduates increase the long-run. This implies increasing
returns to scale. Further research in this area is warranted.
2. U.S. Naval Academy Long-Run Costs
This section will only discuss those costs which
appear to change from fixed to variable in the long-run. The
discussion in the previous section is relevant for the costs
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TABLE 4.1 USNA FY-1989 SHORT-RUN COST RESULTS.
NUMBER OF 2R9UATES: 1,082
TOTAL COST: $ 167,553,973
AVERAGE COST: 154,856
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: 105,996,506
TOTAL VARIABLE COST: 61,557,467
MARGINAL COST PER GRADUATE: $ 56,892
that will remain variable or fixed in the long-run.
This long-run analysis is based on straight
proportions. It is prudent to keep in mind that not all fixed
costs will react to changes in enrollment proportionally. For
example, utility usage rates will vary depending on how the
brigade is organized. Two variations of this would encompass
entire companies being eliminated, and wings of Bancroft Hall
being closed, or midshipmen could be eliminated from each
company, reducing occupancy in all rooms to two people.
Utilities will be used differently for each version. Thus
utilities may not be reduced proportionally to the change in
enrollment.
In the long-run, a reduction of 200 graduates per year
over four years, or 800 midshipmen (not accounting for
attrition), would equate to reducing on average 45 midshipmen
in each of the 18 academic majors. Once again, however, this
will not occur proportionally. Since projecting the future
choices of majors is not realistic, it is assumed that the
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student-to-faculty ratio will remain at approximately ten to
one. This amounts to reducing faculty costs 20 percent.
While the academic computer center will remain open,
materials used will most likely be reduced by 20 percent.
This reduces the overall costs of the computer center by 6
percent. If the 40 library personnel were reduced by
approximately six, or 15 percent, this would reduce overall
library costs by seven percent.
In the midshipmen mess, if 20 percent of the servers
were reduced (O&M,N labor), this would equate to a reduction
in total function costs of nine percent. If the Academy were
accepting 1,100 applicants instead of approximately 1,400,
this would proportionally reduce the number of employees in
the admissions section of the registrar from ten to eight,
thereby decreasing overall expenses by three percent.
Though utility capacity equations were unavailable, a
proportional decrease of 20 percent in usage (O&K,N material)
equates to a decrease in 16 percent of the costs of the
utilities function. & decrease from 1,400 admissions to 1,100
equals a 22 percent decrease in admissions. If the
preparatory school were decreased by approximately ten
percent, this would reduce the overall cost function by ten
percent.
All of. the changes discussed above result in a
decrease of 122 civilian personnel, or a nine percent
reduction, Therefore, a nine percent reduction in the
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civilian personnel office function is assumed. Since the
Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) serves both the military
personnel assigned to the Naval Academy and the naval station,
it is not practical to estimate the reductions in the PSD.
The reductions discussed above, form the basis for the
calculations in Appendix B, and yield the results shown in
Table 4.2. These results are based on a reduction in the
number of graduates from 1,082 to an average of 800 per year,
a 20 percent decrease. These cost results will not be
compared to the costs of the NROTC and OCS program, because
the costs of the latter two programs are exclusively short-run
costs, and do not take into account any long-run changes.
----- m----------------------.n- -- - --------- - --- -
TABLE 4.2 USNA LONG-RUN COST RESULTS,
NUBER. O rRADUATES: 800
TOTAL COSTS: $ 167,553,973
AVERAGE COST: 209,443
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: 60,155,636
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS: 107,398,337
MARGINAL COST PER GRAWATE: $ 134,248
-- nn- - - -nfl - -- na a -nan ----- - a- --- - --
3. NROTC Coats
The Military Pay, Navy (MPN) category of costs is for
the Navy staffing of the NROTC units. This staffing includes
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a unit Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, three to four
Navy officer instructors (depending on the particular unit, it
could be as many as five instructors), one Marine Corps
Captain or Major, one E-6 or E-7 Yeoman (YN), one E-6 or E-7
Storekeeper (SK), one E-6 or E-7 Quartermaster (QM), and a
civilian, usually at the GS-5 level. If the number of
students in the program changed by a large amount, perhaps
one, or at most two, Navy officer instructors could be either
added or subtracted. For the most part, at the margin, this
staff ing arrangement is fixed; therefore, the costs associated
with this category are also fixed.
The Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) category, which
includes the travel costs for Midshipmen during summer
cruises, uniforms, the subsistence allowance, and the naval
science textbooks, is primarily a variable cost category. The
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) category is a mixture
of variable and fixed costs. While tuition is considered
variable, the program/unit operations costs are fixed in the
short-run. These costs would become variable in the long-run,
especially when the prospects of closing a NROTC unit is under
consideration. The NROTC headquarters is a part of CNET's
staff, and their costs are incorporated into CHET. They are
not a part of the direct costs for the NROTC program. These
costs are a part of activity group MX, while the HROTC program
costs are activity group LB. Based on the costs listed in
Table 3.2, the total, average, and marginal costs for fiscal
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year 1989, based on 1,971 graduates, are listed in Table 4.3.
5
Based on the results shown in Table 4.3, fixed costs make up
34.9 percent of NROTC total program costs, while average costs
make up 65.1 percent. Therefore, incremental changes to the
number of graduates should have more of an impact because
total variable costs make up a higher percentage of the total
costs.
TABLE 4.3 NROTC FY-1989 COST RESULTS.
NUMBER OF ORADUATES: 1.971
TOTAL COST: $ 97,527,000
AVERAGE COST: 49,481
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: 34,032,000
TOTAL VARIABLE COST: 63,495,000
MARGINAL COST PER GRADUATE: $ 32,215
-S-S -------- ------ W ----------------
4. OCS Costs
Of all the OCS costs listed in Table 3.4, the
following cost categories are considered variable:
instructional costs for curriculum materials, supplies,
contract, and miscellaneous; the supplies, material,
equipment, and miscellaneous for overhead costs; and the
5?his number is different from the 1,618 graduates reported in
Mrs. Pope's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee for Manpower
as shown in Table 1. Since the 1,971 figure is reported from the
NROTC headquarters, it is accepted as the accurate estimate.
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student pay and allowances. Those cost categories that are
fixed include: instructional costs for supervisory,
administrative and support personnel; and training equipment
maintenance (assuming that maintenance contracts are annual
contracts and fixed for the short-run). The following
overhead costs are considered fixed: the training activity
commander's staff (which includes the salaries of the Navy
instructors); curriculum development, and automated data
processing (ADP).
If OCS were to change their enrollment substantially,
then the number of Navy instructors, and perhaps the ADP
funding might change. However, for small incremental changes,
these costs are virtually fixed. The base support cost
categories are fixed, and these costs are shared with the
other training activities at the Naval Education and Training
Center. These costs include: installation command and staff;
supply; logistics; comptroller; transportation; civilian
personnel; security; facility engineering; safety; morale,
welfare and recreation; utilities; supplies; materials;
equipment; maintenance; contracts; comumunications; and
unaccompanied personnel housing (UPH). The base support costs
are 45.2 percent of the program's fixed costs. Student pay
and allowances are 94.9 percent of the total variable costs,
and 51.9 percent of the total costs. This makes them the
largest single cost factor affecting the OCS program. Table
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4.4 lists the results of the cost calculations for OCS based
on 948.69 graduates.
TABLE 4.4 OCS FY-1989 COST RESULTS.
EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF GRADUATES: 948.69
TOTAL COST: $ 13,338,271
AVERAGE COST: 14,060
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: 6,045,588
TOTAL VARIABLE COST: 7,292,683
MARGINAL LAOST PER GRADUATE: $ 7,687
---------------------------- ----- ~------eeeeee-
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The marginal cost results allow for a sensitivity analysis
of the change in cost that will occur with a change in the
student enrollment at the three commissioning sources. This
sensitivity analysis follows.
1. U.S. Naval Academy
The short-run marginal cost of an Academy graduate is
calculated to be $56,892. Multiplying the marginal cost per
graduate by the change in the number of graduates will yield
the change in total cost. For example, if we reduce the
number of graduates from the Naval Academy by approximately
200 per year, as re'coended in the Department of Defense
report discussed in Chapter II, the total savings to the Navy
would be $11,378,400. This is approximately 6.8 percent of
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the total cost of the program. Reducing the graduating class
size by 100, would yield a savings of $5,689,200,
approximately 3.4 percent of the total cost.
In the long-run, if the assumptions used in making the
proportional changes in fixed costs are approximately correct,
reducing the size of the brigade by approximately 800, an
average reduction of 200 graduates per year, would equate to
a marginal cost per graduate of $134,248. This would yield a
savings of $107,398,400 ($134,248 X 800) over a four-year
period of time.
2. Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps
The marginal cost of an NROTC graduate is calculated
to be $32,215. A ten percent reduction in the number of
graduates, or 197 graduates, yields a reduction in cost of
$6,346,279. This equates to a savings of 6.5 percent of the
total cost of the HROTC program. A reduction of 19 percent,
as recommended in the Department of Defense report, would
equate to 375 fewer graduates and a savings of $12,081,479.
This is 12.4 percent of the total costs. A reduction of this
size may not be accomplished v'ithout the closing of HROTC
units. If this is necessary, a breakdown of the costs by unit
would be necessary to provide a more accurate sensitivity
analysis. Moreover, full average cost would beows relevant
in this situation.
57
3. Officer Candidate School
The marginal cost for an OCS graduate is $7,687. A
decrease in the number of graduates by 100, or approximately
10 percent, would yield a $768,722 savings, or approximately
5.76 percent of total program cost. A reduction of 200
graduates per year, approximately 21 percent, would equate to
a savings of $1,537,400, or 11.5 percent of the total program
cost.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RCOMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The results clearly show that there are pronounced
differences in the cost of graduating an officer from the
Naval Academy, NROTC, and OCS. Regardless of which type of
cost is used to compare the three sources, the rank order
remains the same: the Naval Academy remains the most costly,
followed by NROTC, and then OCS. Several studies, discussed
in this thesis, have compared commissioning sources using the
average cost per graduate. However, this thesis argues that
marginal cost is a more relevant comparison if the decision
maker has decided against closing the source completely,
particularly in the short-run. For example, if average cost
were used to determine the short-run savings for the Naval
Academy from a decrease of 200 graduates per year, the
estimated savings would be $31.6 million ($154,856 X 200).
The estimated savings falls to $11.4 million (856,0892 X 200)
when marginal cost is used. Because of the large fixed costs
at the Academy, the perceived savings would be overestimated
in the short-run using average cost.
In comparing the marginal cost factors across sources, one
sees that the cost categories are similiar. These categories
include student pay and allowances, instructional costs for
the classroom (curriculummaterials, supplies). transportation
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expenses, tuition for NROTC, and military and physical
education training costs for the Naval Academy. In comparing
average cost factors across the sources, the categories are
vastly different, especially for the Naval Academy with its
large fixed assets. When comparing the three sources, it is
interesting to note the differences in the composition of
total cost. Table 5.1 illustrates these percentages.
TABLE 5.1 TOTAL COST COMPOSITION AMONG COMMISSIONING SOURCES.




The Naval Academy is the only source where fixed costs
comprise a majority of the total costs. This is the reason
why marginal costs are closer for each source than are average
costs, as shown in Table 5.2.
T-A-BE 5,2 FY-1989 MARGINAL COSTER -ORDUATE.





1. The Costs and Benefits of This Research
rhis thesis potentially benefits Navy manpower
planners in Washington. It provides a timely marginal cost
analysis that will assist in the decision-making process of
officer force reductions. It also recomnends areas of further
research.
This study, and subsequent force reductions, will have
negative spillover effects, particularly for the commissioning
sources, and the young Americans that will not receive
appointments because of reduced officer requirements. Taken
as the sole justification for reducing commissioning sources,
the more expensive institutions should be reduced in favor of
the cheaper sources. This may not be the most advantageous
method. Further research on the productivity of officers by
commissioning source, and the efficiency of each source is
warranted.
For NROTC, the institutions that are the most costly
may receive fewer resources to accomplish their mission. If
all of the most costly units receive the same proportional
cut, this will fotce the inefficient units, if any, to become
more efficient. However this would also degrade the
capabilities of efficient units. Cost alone, should not be
the deciding factor.
The reduction of officer accessions will reduce the
opportunity of those young Americans that desire to attend the
more costly, perhaps more prestigious schools in the country.
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For example, if NROTC scholarships to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) were reduced in favor of a less
expensive college, perhaps the Navy would lose those high
quality applicants desiring to attend MIT.
2. Alternatives
There are alternatives to, and extensions of, a
marginal cost analysis that are important to consider when
contemplating reductions in officer recruitment. A true cost-
benefit analysis would consider all of the relevant issues of
the subject. This thesis focused on just a small portion of
the issue concerning officer accession sources. A natural
extension of a short-run marginal cost analysis would be a
long-run analysis where altering fixed capital, such as
facilities, would be an option. Closing a commissioning
source, such as the Naval Academy, could be an option in this
type of study. A long-run study could analyze every possible
option. Based on monetary costs alone, the Navy could save a
considerable amount in the long-run. This type of analysis
should also consider the political permutations involved.
This type of action may result in the Navy losing some of its
direct ties with Congress, on the local level, due to reduced
involvement through the nomination process.
An alternative study might include an examination of
the comparable costs of students attending civilian
universities and colleges. This adds a perspective that Navy
decision-makers could use as a comparison.
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An examination of the social costs and impact of
reducing and/or closing NROTC units at universities is also
necessary. Tha savings to the Navy might not justify the
spillover effects to society (in the form of less income for
universities and surrounding businesses), and the lack of
political support by local Congressmen. The non-economic
costs of reducing NROTC commissions should also be examined.
The Navy may lose valuable visibility on those civilian
college campuses where NROTC units are terminated, perhaps
losing recruitment opportunities of high quality college youth
for NROTC and OCS.
NROTC also provides 33 percent of the Navy's black
officers and 20 percent of its Hispanic officers. Six of the
NROTC units are an important source of minority accessions
because they are located on historically black campuses.6
[Ref. 16] Reducing commissions through NROTC without an
examination of the spillover effectfs to the Navy's equal
opportunity goals, might further exacerbate efforts to reach
the seven percent black, and four percent Hispanic minority
commission targets. [Ref. 17] Likewise, in fiscal year 1988,
OCS graduated 59 percent of the newly commissioned Hispanic
officers and 50 percent of the newly commissioned black
officers [Ref. 16]. An alternative study might also include
'he historically black colleges with NROTC units are;
Florida A&H University, Southern University and A&S College,
Savannah State College, Prairie View A&M University, Morehouse
college, and the consortium of Hampton University, Norfolk State
University, and Old Dominion University.
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the effects on minority goals if significantly reducing
commissions via this source. This type ,f study may help
balance equal opportunity needs with efficient and effective
reductions in accessions.
OCS provides the major avenue for civilian college
graduates to obtain a commission in the Navy. Decreasing this
source of commission would eliminate this source of employment
for some college graduates. OCS also commissions the highest
percentage (32 percent) of nuclear surface/submarine officer
accessions. In addition, the Navy receives the majority of
its supply officers from OCS. If the Navy limits the effect
of the reductions on the nuclear and supply officers, there
may be an overall shortage in the number of commissions of
surface warfare officers. A follow-on study should include
the long-run impact of reducing officer cotmissions on each
:xicer community. The objective would be to prevent future
shortages in any specific community.
OCS is also a path for enlisted personnel to achieve
a commission after obtaining their degree while on active
duty. Reducing OCS commissions limits this opportunity. For
those who do receive a commission, the Navy incurs a cost to
refill that enlisted billet. However, the benefit is a more
"seasoned" officer.
The non-economic alternative studies discussed above
should be examined in addition to the long-run cost analysis.
The likelihood of closing traditional institutions, such as
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the Naval Academy, are remote at best. However, the spillover
effects of the non-economic costs could cause shortages of
officers in different Zonmnunities and affect long-term Navy
goals.
Included in the alternatives that policy makers should
consider when restructuring officer accession programs are
other factors that cannot be quantitatively measured in a
thesis. Perhaps Mrs. Pope was trying to capture these factors
when she stated:
Although the edu.-cation of the individual is a major
benefit of the USNA and NROTC programs, this is not
what makes them unique. Instead, it is the
development of a cadre professional military
officer force deeply imbued with the highest
traditions and heritage of the naval service,
dedicated to a career of service to their country.i [Ref. 1:p. 1]
B. REUCOMENDATIONS
From the conclusions drawn in the first section of this
chapter, the first reconuendation of this thesis is for
decision makers to use marginal cost for any comparative
analysis of commissioning sources in the short-run. Marginal
cost particularly should be used for any estimations of the
savings to be gained by reducing the number of graduates.
All three commissioning sources provide high quality
officers. The unique characteristics of each source, when
considered with the relatively small differences between
short-run marginal costs per graduate, lead one to the
conclusion that all three sources must be maintained to
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provide an optimal mix of accessions to meet the demands of
the Navy at any point in time.
Therefore, the second recommendation of this thesis is
that no commissioning source be completely eliminated on the
basis of cost alone. If the Department of Defense must reduce
officer accessions, then incremental reductions from the more
costly Naval Academy and NROTC programs would seem
appropriate.
An optimal mix of officers should be determined based on
the current and projected needs of the Navy. The third
reconmendation of this thesis is for the Navy to develop a
goal programming model to determine the most effective number
of officer accessions from each source. This analysis should
consider the current and projected constraints the Navy is
facing, and the goals of the nation's leaders as well as the
leaders in the Departments of Defense and Navy. Once this
complex yet flexible model is developed, it can be altered to
reflect the present issues, and then included in a decision
support system for all policy makers.
The data for this research was spread across the United
States including Newport, Rhode Island, CNET in Florida,
Annapolis, Maryland, and Washington, DC. The data received
were not directly comparable. Discrepancies existed in the
number of fiscal year 1989 graduates from each of the three
commissioning sources. Where a discrepancy existed, the
numbers from the actual commissioning source were used. The
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Army uses a system called the Army Manpower Cost System
(AMCOS) in which all costs for commissioning sources may be
found.
The fourth recommendation of this thesis is to create a
centralized database where all of the correct, raw,
disaggregated, cost data is collected after it has been
approved by the Navy. This will help alleviate discrepancies.
One discrepancy includes differences in the reported amount of
actual man-months of training conducted by OCS in fiscal year
1989. In addition, the Naval Academy reported that 1,082
officers graduated in fiscal year 1989, while the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
reported that 958 midshipmen graduated. Finally, the
Congressional Budget Office reported that the Navy
commissioned 7,800 officers in fiscal year 1989, while the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs reported 6.554 officer accessions. All this data was
suppose to have come from the same source, the U.S. Navy. The
point is not to find fault with any of the sources of
information. However, it ins important to note that there are
discrepancies in the data.
The formulation and maintenance of an all encompassing
database would be costly. However, the benefits may outweigh
the costs considering the importance that Congress, DOD, and
DON place on restructuring the military through enlisted
recruitment and officer accessionO. other stakeholders, Such
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as the Congressional Budget Office (providing research for the
Congress), the Center for Naval Analyses (providing research
for the Department of Defense), and the Governmont Accounting
Office would be interested in this complete master database.
The time and energy used to reproduce this data for various
inquiries might be worth the costs involved. This database
could be tied into the decision support system which embodied
the goal programming model recommended above.
Fifth, further research should be conducted in the area of
a long-run cost analysis. While this thesis used broad,
proportional reductions to show possible effects in the long-
run, exact unit measurements would be more precise. This
research could also include an estimation of the effects of
economies of scale, discussed previously in this thesis.
Evidence from other research indicates that economies of scale
do exist in public education systems with a large capital
base. If this is true at the Naval Academy, then the Navy's
returns to scale should be determined. If the Academy is on
the increasing returns to scale portion of the cost curve,
then increasing the number of graduates through the Academy
would reduce the average and marginal cost per graduate, up to
a certain point. Further research in this area may show that
the Navy can use its established capital assets more
efficiently by shifting more of its accessions to USNA.
Sixth, because the non-economic costs of reducing officers
accessions were not explored in this thesis, but are essential
68
to effective decision-making processes, further research into
these costs is warranted.
In the long-run, reductions in the number of commissions
will likely be shared by all three sources. In the interim,
based on cost alone, USNA and NROTC should incur relatively
greater reductions, while OCS will remain a flexible source,
throttling accessions in the short-run to make up for any gaps
in the officer force structure. In the end, the Navy must
retain the ability to produce quality officers from all three
sources, while maintaining the flexibility to increase officer
end-strength, should the need arise.
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APPENDIX A. USNA COST DATA
TABLE A.1 FY-1989 USNA COSTS BY SUBFUNCTION
Item Function O&M,N O&WN MPN TOTAL
Labor Material
1. ACADEMIC DEAN
a. Academic Dean 932737 492591 134017 1559345
b. Director
Research 148112 24563 172675
c. Travel 27658 27658
d. Honors Program 142071 142071
e. SECNAV Fellows 75012 75012
f. Academic Center 72709 15799 87302 175810
g. Search Comintt. 2630 2630
Div- Eng & Weps
h. Admin Support 78428 50595 674690 803713
i. Technical Supp,1930807 199444 2130251
J. Aerospace Eng. 721406 165652 289104 1176162
k. Electrical Eng.1002418 379330 983192 2364940
1. Mech. Eng. 1465595 406674 656976 2529245
m. Naval Sys. Eng.1215767 226079 1249428 2691274
n. Weapons Eng. 730071 474632 1050156 2254859
o. CADIG 281019 224454 505473
p. Hydrochem. Lab 331270 110444 441714
Div. English/History
q. Admin Support 61001 50397 205190 316588
r. English 1535639 165182 484692 2185513
3. History 1711454 137640 537737 2386831
t. Forensics 10664 10664
Div. Math & Science
u. Admin Support 169057 114875 153324 437256
v. Chemistry 1446054 435766 444553 2326373
w. Applied Sci. 646646 156749 795485 1598880
a. Oceanography 418689 256990 746357 1422036
y. Mathematics 2940395 304779 1288028 4533202
%. Physics 1849056 525670 585369 2960095
Div. US & International Studies
&a. Admin Support 99721 40867 190834 331422
bb. Area Language 850989 126016 91020 1068025
cc. Economics 780038 50068 466325 1296431
dd. Political Sci. 891969 125323 365175 1382467
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TABLE A.1 FY-1989 UBRa CQSTS BY SUBrUIICTIO CO!TIIED.
Item Function O&MN O&MN MPN TOTAL
Lgbor Material
Other
ee. Foreign Officers 594448 594448
ff. Other Services 994897 994897
TOTAL 22311047 5518614 13068299 40897960
2. AUDIO VISUAL SUPPORT
a. Educ. Resources 70962 787909 858871
TOTAL 70962 787909 858871
3. ACADEMIC COMPUTER CENTER




staff 439565 236690 4151358 4827613
b. Mid. travel 1639516 1639516
c. Dir. PRODEV 109405 71553 572181 753139
d. Comdt. Academic
Admin 24171 28940 53111
e. Leadership & Law245536 20600 1277233 1543369
f. Seamanship & Nav 22506 41511 3220104 3284121
g. Off ier/Civ Travel 109642 109642
h. Small Craft Fuel 128282 128282
i. Small Craft Fac1853765 859698 4859253 7572716
j. Weapons Training 52596 39654 168976 261226
k. Sail Training 268164 548198 827591 1643953
1. Fuel Operations 106881 106881
m. VTNA 158877 158877
TOTAL 3015708 3990042 15076696 22082446
6. PHYSICAL EDUCATION
1865291 411372 1421272 3697935
7. LIBRARY
a. Library 1454649 1220022 2674671
b. Archives 119364 39722 159086
TOTAL 1574013 1259744 2833757
8. MIDSHIMEN MESS
a. Mid. Food Ser.3054736 705907 308023 4148666
b. Wardroom Contract 2363483 2363483
c. Equip. Purch. 2626 2626
TOTAL 3054736 3072016 388023 6514775
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TABLE A.1 FY-1989 USNA COBTS BY SUBiMCTION CONTINUED,




& Social Activ 31001 31001
b. Mid. Activitiez180741 5738 186479
c. MRAF Officer 63309 63309
d. Chaplain 142755 97131 702323 942209
e. Counseling Ctr. 23393 6544 211921 241858
TOTAL 377890 i09413 1115168 1602471
10. REGISTRAR
a. Publications 0
b. Admissions 380125 127096 507221
c. Registrar 240288 25527 265815
d. Nominations &
Appointments 144474 10497 154971
e. Candidate Guid.228120 190258 1231497 1649875
f. Travel 101318 101318
g. Recruiting eunds 108000 108000
TOTAL 993007 562696 1231497 2787200
11, STUDENT PAY AND ALLOWANCE$
a. Base Pay 270534!0 27053410
b. Rations 60153608 6025368
c. FICA 2016191 2016191
TOTAL 35094969 35094969
12. MEDICAL
a. Dental Clinic 101700 1411438 1513138
b, Medical Clinic 69539 2334541 2404080
c: Veterinary Servicts 40291 40291
d. N!RC Bethesda 491656 4 1656
e. Anna Arundel Hospital i600 54600
TO"AL 17123 446256 3786270 4503765
15. BAND 23105 1108523 1131626
14. PRINTING PL&NT
15. .MWIN DATA PROCESSZNG
16, CIVILIA PERS. 1062751 97832 1160583
17. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
a. Per4 & Admin 231809 141119 276163 649091
b. NAVSTA Admin 181118 43520 771775 996413
c. NPVSTA Travel 43133 43133
d. PSD 180376 285028 465404
593303 227772 1332966 2154041
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TABLE- OWL AT~jss con Y rmcniox COTIUED.
Item Function O&M,N O&WN MPN TOTAL
Labor Material
18. SPECIAL SERV!CES 36511 95080 146328 277959
19. OTHER PERSONNEL SERVICES
a. Search Committee 0
b. PC$ 0
c. EEO 118369 8873 127242
d. Human Goals 238250 30403 66590 335243
e. Safety 208585 51442 125879 385906
f.BQ 32015 38667 70682
. O&F Club 0
it Enlisted Club 0
i. NAVSTA Chaplain 20644 14305 86596 121545
j. USNA Legal Off. 32449 4649 37098
k. Club Support 0
1. Equipment Leaa 0
TOTAL 618297 141687 317732 1077716
20. UTILITY SERV. 1355996 6166472 7522468
21. CUSTODI-L SERVICES 2989576 2989576
22. FIRE PROTECTION 1358566 53989 1412555
23. MAINTENANCE & ENGINEERING
a. Admin 109133 109133
b. Recur. Maint. 7306153 6380302 13686455
a. Non-te, aint. 9537962 9537962
d. Gen. Maint. 2625259 4609729 7234988
e. Minor Constr, 8631 4789% 56521
f. Pets. Supp. 56734 26008 82742
g. Mission Ops, 328892
h. Minus 12/R2 9308146 9308146
i. UA CBU 403 67603 1012627 1080230
TOTAL 10105910 11361348 1341519 22808777
24. COMMUNICATIONS
a. Base Services 180658 1290305 1470963
b. Com. only 96290 304184 400474
c. 50% Comm. Offset 44598 152092 196690
TOTAL 180658 1341997 152092 1674747
25. TRANS. OPS. & EQUIP MAINT.
a. Ops/Maint. 1068653 594611 7!663264
b. Supply 102714 102714
TOTAL 1171367 594611 1765978
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TABLE A.1 FY-1989. USNA COSTS BY SUBFUNCTION CONTINUED.
Item Function O&M,N O&M,N MPN TOTAL
Labor Material
26. COMMISSARY & FOOD SERVICES
a. Navy Exchange 31655 31655
b. Comissary
Store (50%) 187433 104591 292024
c. Food Service 19413 414818 434231
TOTAL 206846 551064 757910
27. SUPPLY & SERVICES OPS.
a. Supply 1076557 224425 558303 1859285
b. NAVSTA Supply 69419 280318 204599 554336
c. Laundry 188366 188366
TOTAL 1145976 693109 762902 2601987
28. LOGISTICS
29. COMPTROLLER
a. Comdt. & Staff 100218 63309 163527
b. Deputy for
Mngmt. 760018 290032 270356 1320406
c. PSD (Disburs.
Only) 160786 196090 356876
d. Centralized
Civilian Pay 34296 34296
TOTAL 1055318 290032 529755 1875105
30. SECURITY
a. Phys. Ed. 192154 192154
b. Comdt. Guards 101119 67669 63074 231861
c. Security Dept.1135152 41486 74053 1250691
d. Marines 17793 1308045 1325838
e. 1st Lt. 37910 7752 424185 469847
f. Nay. Investigative
Service 96r?8 6200 102238
TOTAL 1370218 140900 1511118 3572629
31. PREP SCHOOL
a. O&MN/MPN 540303 934469 1371711 2846483
b. Military Pay Stud. 3063356 3063356
TOTAL 540303 934469 4435067 5909839
32. PCS TRAVEL
33. MILITARY SUPPORT UNIT 45240 398018 243258
34. MUSEUM 183248 14572 197820
J5. PAO 391529 320066 332436 1044031
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TABLE A.1 FY-1989 USN COSTS BY SUBFUNCTION CONTINUED.
Item Function O&MN O&M,N MPN TOTAL
Labor Material
36. COMMAND & STAFF
a. Superintendent
& Staff 82208 77361 871662 1031231
b. CO NAVSTA 21052 500 104086 125638
c. Contingency Funds
of Supt. 49842 49842
TOTAL 103260 127703 975748 1206711
37. ALL OTHER FUNCTIONS
38. STEWART ARMY ANNEX
ACADEMY TOTAL 56772496 42895319 85839176 185506991
Notes: (1) All notes for Table 3.1 pertain to this Table.
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TABLE A.2 FY-1986 THROUGH FY-1988 USNA COSTS BY FUNCTION
Item, FY-1986 FY-1987 FY-1988,
1.Ac.Dean 27326962 31030000 38115438
2.Audio/Visual 680081 570000 908838
3.Acad. Computer 2393634 2458272 3032534
4.Faculty Train.
5.Military Train 20727414 21336556 24048914
6.Phys. Ed. 3491555 3555456 3805867
7.Library 2081989 2268784 2703820
8.ic. Hess 6867972 6254192 6406529
9.Stud. Services 1150233 1382935 1068095
10.Registrar 2391755 3284322 2667185
11.Stud. Pay 33455586 33479464 34610260
12.Medical 5372678 5976740 2901128
13.Band 1829019 1960420 1899947
14.Printing Plant
15.Admin Data Proc.
16.Civilian Pers. 973425 1020824 973405
17.Pers. Admin 1785546 2157158 3065007
18.Spec. Serv. 479952 549704 704640
19.Other Pers.Ser.1379988 1564675 1394566
20.Utilities 7108925 6958540 6108269
21.Custodial Ser. 3254127 3276589 2431092
22.Fire Protect. 1166355 1272105 1320532
23.Maint.& Eng. 13929354 14070945 16160855
24.Communications 1415852 1471986 1248269
25.Trans.Equip. 1570693 1718208 1625518
26.Commissary 1287371 1573653 1298824
27.Supp.& Serv. 1870023 1984804 2065001
28.Logistic Activities
29.Comptroller 1548148 1574117 1862952
30.Security 2234602 2421934 3463188
31.Prep School 4406558 4582820 5313046
32.PCS Travel 422041 434702 (1)
33.Mil.Supp.Unit 427936 445053 474418
34.Museum 158686 167530 176114
35.Public Affairs 873650 906671 954273
36.Command & Staff 882533 893943 1230677
37.All Other Functions
38.Stewart Army SubDost
TOTAL 155040216 162701748 174039201
Notes: (1) PCS Travel was omitted from cost functions since
FY-1988 because these costs were found to also be
iicluded in the MPN account. Since they were
counted before FY-1988, those figures available
were used in the marginal cost calculations.
(2) All notes in Table 3.1 are pertinent to this Table.
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APPENDIX B. USNA MARGINAL COST CALCULATIONS
TABLE B.1 USNA SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST CALCULATIONS
Item FY-1989 FY-1988 FY-1987 FY-1986
PF. V................ ...... F V
1. 40897960 38115433 31030000 27326962
2. 858871 908838 570000 680081
3. 3247524 3032534 2458272 2393634
4.
5. 53111 22029335 57958 23990956 51421 21285135 49953 20677461
6. 3286563 411372 3254314 551553 3159947 395509 3103154 388401
7. 2833757 2703820 2268784 2081989
8. 6514775 6406529 6254192 6867972
9. 1602471 1068095 1382935 1150233
10. 2787200 2667185 3284322 2391755
11. 35094969 34610260 33479464 33455586
12. 4503765 2901128 5976740 5372678
13. 1131628 1899947 1960420 1829019
14.
15.
16. 1160583 973405 1020824 973425
17. 2154041 3065007 2157158 1785546
18, 277959 704640 549704 479952
19. 1077716 1394566 1564675 1379988
20. 7522468 6108269 6958540 7108925
21. 2989576 2431092 3276589 3254127
22. 1412555 1320532 1272105 1166355
23.22808777 16160855 14070945 13929354
24. 1674747 1248269 1471986 1415852
25. 1171367 594611 1148499 477019 1139687 578521 1041841 528852
26. 757910 1298824 1573653 1287371
27. 2413621 188366 1915516 149485 1841124 143680 1734652 135371
28.
29. 1875105 1862952 1574117 1548148
30. 3572629 3463188 2421934 2234602
31. 934469 4975370 840099 4472947 724636 3858184 696765 3709793
32. 434702 422041
33. 243258 474418 445053 427936
34. 197820 176114 167530 158686
35. 1044031 954273 906671 873650
36, 1206711 1230677 893943 882533
37.
TOTAL VC 63294023 64252220 59740493 58895464
~A~q9rLL~jt~g~ -P Y-1 9U..XFIUIXI9.tLIFi2ln
0.231 0.235 0.249 0.288
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TABLE B.1 USNA SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST CALCULATIONS CONTINUED.
STEP 1: Multiply the total variable costs for the particular
fiscal year by the corresponding class percentage of the
brigade.
FY-1989 0.231 X 63294023 = 14620919.31
FY-1988 0.235 X 64252220 = 15099271.7
FY-1987 0.249 X 59740493 = 14875382.76
FY-1986 0.288 X 58895464 = 16961893.63
STEP 2: Add the prorated costs = 61557467.4
STEP 3: Divide the total by the number of graduates: 1,082
61557467.4 56892.298
1082
SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST PER GRADUATE: $56,892
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TABLE B.2 USNA LONG-RUN MARINAL COST CALCULTIONS
ILt.em FY-1989 FY-1988 FY-1987 FY-1986
SF.. .. . .. . v ... . F v v
1. 32718368 30492350 24824000 21861570
2. 858871 908838 570000 680081
3. 3052673 2850582 2310776 2250016
4.
5. 53111 22029335 57958 23990956 51421 21285135 49953 20677461
6. 3286563 411372 3254314 551553 3159947 395509 3103154 388401
7. 2635394 2703820 2268784 2081989
8. 5926445 5894007 5691315 6249855
9. 1602471 1068095 1382935 1150233
10. 2703584 2587169 3185792 2320002
11. 35094969 34610260 33479464 33455586
12. 4503765 2901128 5976740 5372678
13. 1131628 1899947 1960420 1829019
14.
15.
16. 1090948 885799 928950 885817
17. 2154041 3065007 2157158 1785546
18, 277959 704640 549704 479952
19. 1077716 1394566 1564675 1379988
20. 6318873 5130946 5845174 5971497
21. 2989576 2431092 3276589 3254127
22. 1412555 1320532 1272105 1166355
23.22808777 16160855 14070945 13929354
24. 1674747 1248269 1471986 1415852
25. 1171367 594611 1148499 477019 1139667 578521 1041841 528852
26. 757910 1298824 1573653 1207371
27. 2413621 188366 1915516 149485 1841124 143680 1734652 135371
28.
29. 1875105 1862952 1574117 1548148
30. 3572629 3463188 2421934 2234602
31. 841022 4477833 756089 4025652 652172 3472366 627089 3338814
32. 434702 422041
33. 243258 474418 445053 427936
34. 197820 176114 167530 158686
35. 1044031 954273 906671 873650
36. 1206711 1230677 893943 882533
37.
TOTAL VC 116143658 112830524 102606609 98975462
Percent of Briaade: FY1O,..._.EJ1988 FY-1987 FY-1986
0.231 0.235 0.249 0.288
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TABLE B.2 USNA LONG-RUN MARGINAL COST CALCULATIONS CONTINUED.
STEP 1: Multiply the long-run total variable costs for the
particular fiscal year by the corresponding class percentage
of the brigade.
FY-1989 0.231 X 116143658 = 26829185
FY-1988 0.235 X 112830524 = 26515173
FY-1987 0.249 X 102606609 = 25549046
FY-1986 0.288 X 98975462 = 28504933
STEP 2: Add the prorated costs = 107398337




LONG-RUN MARGINAL COST PER GRADUATE: $ 134,248
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